ease does not exist until we have agreed that it does-by perceiving, naming, and responding to it (Rosenberg 1986) .
Disease can, o f course, be construed in one o f its primary aspects as the working out o f a pathological process. As such it exists in animals-who presumably do not socially construct their ailments and negotiate attitudinal responses to sufferers-but who do experience pain and impairment o f function. And one can cite instances o f human disease that existed in a purely biological sense-certain inborn errors o f metabolism, for example-before their existence was disclosed by an increasingly knowledgeable biomedical community. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that in our culture a disease does not exist as a social phenomenon until we agree that it does. And those acts o f agreement have during the past century become increasingly central to social as well as medical thought (assuming the two can in some useful ways be distinguished). Many physicians and laypersons have chosen, for example, to label certain behaviors as disease even when a somatic basis remains unclear-and possibly non-existent: one can cite the instances o f alcoholism, homosexuality, or " hyperactivin . ' As we are well aware, the status o f homosexuality as " disease" has been in recent years an object o f explicit and instructive contention (Bayer 1981) .
Much has been written during the past two decades about the social construction o f illness. But in an important sense this is no more than a tautology-a specialized restatement o f the truism that men and women construct themselves culturally. Every aspect o f an in dividual's social identity is constructed-and thus also is disease. Although this social-constructionist position has lost much of its novelty during the past decade, it still serves to remind us o f some important things. Perhaps most significant is the fact that medical thought and practice is rarely free of social and cultural constraint, even in matters seemingly technical. The explanation o f sickness is too sensitive-socially and emotionally-for it to be a value-free en terprise. It is no accident that several generations o f anthropologists have assiduously concerned themselves with disease concepts in a variety o f non-Western cultures; agreed-upon etiologies at once in corporate and sanction a society's fundamental ways o f organizing its world. Medicine in the contemporary West is b y no means divorced from such affinities.
Some o f those constraints reflect values, attitudes, and status re lationships in the larger culture (o f which physicians, like their pa tients are part). But medicine, like the scientific disciplines to which it has been so closely linked in the past century, is itself a social system; even those technical aspects o f medicine seemingly little sub ject to the importunate demands o f cultural assumption are shaped in part by the shared intellectual worlds and institutional structures o f particular communities o f scientists and physicians. These realities all interact to play a role in the process through which we formulate and agree upon definitions o f disease. In this sense, the term " social history o f medicine" is as tautological as that o f the " social construc tion" o f disease; every aspect o f medicine's history is necessarily " so cial"-that acted out in laboratory or library as well as at the bedside.
In the following pages I have, in fact, avoided the term social construction. I felt it has tended to overemphasize functionalist ends and the degree o f arbitrariness inherent in the negotiations that result in accepted disease pictures. It has focused, in addition, on a handful o f socially resonant diagnoses-hysteria, chlorosis, neurasthenia, and homosexuality, for example. It invokes, moreover, a particular style o f cultural criticism and particular moment in time. I have chosen instead to use the less programmatically charged metaphor " frame" rather than " construct" to describe the fashioning o f explanatory schemes for particular diseases.
During the past two decades, social scientists, historians, and phy sicians have shown a growing interest in disease and its history; the attention paid social-constructivist views o f disease is one aspect o f a multifaceted scholarly concern. The response to AIDS in recent years has only added impetus to and focused public attention on an already thriving academic enterprise. The recent interest in the history o f disease has reflected and in corporated a number o f separate-and not always consistent-trends.
One is the emphasis among professional historians on social history and the experience o f ordinary men and women. Pregnancy and child birth, for example, like epidemic disease have become an accepted part o f the standard historical canon. A second focus o f interest in disease centers on public health policy and a linked concern with explanation o f the demographic transition; how much credit should go to specific medical interventions for the decline in morbidity and lengthening life spans, and how much to changed economic and social circumstances.^ The name o f Thomas McKeown has been closely as sociated with revitalizing this century-old debate (McKeown and Re cord 1962; McKeown 1976a McKeown , 1976b (Crosby 1972 (Crosby , 1986 M cNeill 1976) . Fourth, has been the influence o f demography among a quantitatively oriented generation o f historians and o f history among a growing number o f demographers. The study o f individual disease provides one strategy for ascertaining the mechanisms underlying aggregate change in morbidity and mortality figures. practitioner, and the collective effort to make cognitive and policy sense out o f those perceptions. Yet, this process o f recognition and rationalization is a significant problem in itself, one that transcends any single generation s time-bound effort to shape satisfactory con ceptual frames for those biological phenomenon it regards as o f special concern. Nor can it while men and women seek cure and understand ing o f their ills and physicians seek the reputation that comes with innovation and publication. Where an underlying pathophysiologic basis for a putative disease remains problematic-as in alcoholism for example-we have another sort o f framemaking, but one that never theless reflects in its style the plausibility and prestige o f an unam biguously somatic, mechanism-oriented model o f disease. This re ductionist tendency has been logically and historically tied to another characteristic o f our thinking about disease-and that is its specificity.
Disease in History
In our culture, its existence as specific entity is a fundamental aspect o f the intellectual and moral legitimacy o f disease. If it is not specific, it is not a disease and a sufferer not entitled to the sympathy-and in recent decades often the reimbursement-connected with an agreedupon diagnosis.
Framing Disease
Disease begins with perceived and often physically manifest symptoms.
In all those centuries before the nineteenth, physicians and their patients had to try to make sense out o f these symptoms-imposing an array o f speculative mechanisms on the otherwise opaque body.
The condition called " dropsy" provides an excellent case in point.
As Steven Peitzman (1989) clinicians defined and redefined that agreed-upon picture o f Bright's disease. Microscopic pathology focused on the fine structure o f the lesions characteristically associated with renal disease. In the twentieth century, the interests o f a physiologically oriented and self-consciously scientific generation o f nephrologists turned to functional criteriasupplanting the anatomical, lesion-oriented conception o f the disease so influential in previous decades. Finally, Peitzman argues, we have in the past two decades created a very different de facto framework around renal dialysis; most patients never become dropsical at all and their experience is that o f dialysis and not the illness dialysis is meant to avert. End-stage renal disease (ESRD) has a fundamentally admin istrative meaning today; it is an automatic trigger for reimbursing Rheumatic fever might well, he argues, not have existed in its nine teenth-century clinical form much before its perceived emergence during that century o f enormous social change. Yet as he also reminds us, institutions and ideas in medicine were evolving at the same time.
The greater likelihood o f hospitalization, for example, and the prom inence o f hospital-based studies in discerning and defining clinical entities almost certainly played a role in framing what phy^sicians came to call rheumatic fever, with its characteristic-and attention-focus ing-incidence o f cardiac involvement. English is equally well aware that the conceptual and technical tools to correlate systematically appearances after death with symptoms in life did not really exist before the beginning o f the nineteenth century. This timing consti tutes an intricate and intractable, yet highly significant, dilemma.
How does one make sense o f this interactive negotiation over time, this framing o f pathophysiologic reality in which the tools of the framer and the picture to be framed may well have both been changing (and in which the relation between a ll instances o f symptom-producing interactions between humans and streptococci and that portion actually identified as rheumatic fever remained unclear)?
The history o f that clinical entity called rheumatic fever illustrates not only a conceptual evolution, but a necessarily related and parallel It seemed that it would be only a matter o f time before physicians understood all those mysterious ills that had puzzled their professional predecessors for millennia; the relevant pathogenic mi croorganisms need only be found and their physiological or biochem ical effects understood. This was an era, as is well known, in which energetic-and sometimes overly credulous or ambitious-physicians " discovered" microorganisms responsible for almost every ill known to humankind.
In his discussion o f parasitology, John Farley (1989) illustrates the more general truth that particular framing options were not equally available to would-be framers. The parasite model seemed in the first Intellectual and institutional history defined, that is, certain options as immediately accessible, defining others as relatively unavailable to physicians and biologists as they sought understanding o f particular ills. The slowness to generalize models o f parasitism to human disease was as much a contingent aspect o f a particular history as was the often unthinking and mechanical application o f other models-most conspicuously in the parallel history o f the bacteriological theory of infectious disease.
But the framing o f disease is in another ot its dimensions rooted in the necessities o f care and the specific biological character of par ticular ailments. Tuberculosis provides a useful example. The most important single cause o f death (and an important factor impoverishing families) in the nineteenth century, consumption provided a challenge to policy makers and welfare authorities as well as to physicians. Ubiquitous and discouraging, it constituted a problem o f a very different kind than, let us say, cholera, yellow fever, or typhoid. The course o f the disease was unpredictable and the great majority of victims deteriorated gradually, hoping all the while to live and work a normal life as long as they could; when that became impossible they needed food, warmth, and care. Many hospitals would not admit them as incurable; most families could ill afford to care for wives, husbands, and children when their symptoms became well defined (Bates 1988) . Romantic glorification o f the consumptive was a rarefied and largely literary phenomenon.
W ith K och's demonstration o f the tubercule bacillus (1882) and the growing faith in sanitarium treatment, perceived options changed.
Yet, the situation was still a difficult one. Proving the contagiosity o f consumption posed a question; it did not provide answers. These had to come from public authorities and private charity. Only grad ually did these sources provide institutional care for the poor as well as the prosperous-and only gradually did the medical and nursing professions find an appropriate framework within which to organize their own response. Even the apparent need to identify and isolate sources o f contagion did not lead to immediate sequestration o f active cases. Some physicians opposed such compulsory measures and then refused to cooperate with notification requirements when imposed (Fox 1975 ). State and local governments were slow to provide the enormous sums such a policy implied. Most physicians did not care to treat patients who showed little tendency to recover-and those with more I do not mean to imply that such decisions were no more than enlightened responses to medicine's changing understanding o f the transmission o f such ills. Particular decisions to build new water systems reflected political alliances, economic pressures, and social perceptions-including attitudes toward the medical profession and toward infectious disease itself.
Disease as Frame
Once crystallized in the form o f specific entities and seen as existing in particular individuals, disease serves as a social actor and mediator.
This is an ancient truth. It would have hardly surprised a leper in the twelfth century, or a plague victim in the fourteenth. Nor, in another way, would it have surprised a " sexual invert" at the end of the nineteenth century. Michael MacDonald's (1989) study o f suicide in early modern Eng land underlines both the antiquity and negotiated quality of disease definitions; it illustrates as well the possibility o f medicalizing behavior and thus changing its moral-and in the case o f suicide, legalmeaning. Perhaps most strikingly, it illustrates the way in which medical personnel and formal medical thinking constituted only one factor in a diverse social and intellectual context. Suicide became increasingly a retrospective evidence o f exculpatory disease-as in instance after instance ordinary Englishmen preferred that option to its legally and traditionally mandated alternative. They chose not to label their deceased family members, friends, and neighbors as crim inally responsible for their final act-and in doing so to forfeit their property to the state. It provides as well an instance in which behavior alone could serve as the crucial element in a " diagnosis" o f " sickness."
Certainly the circumstances surrounding suicide-the need to ne gotiate concrete determinations at a particular moment in time, for example, and the gradient defined by the harsh and brutal alternatives to a verdict o f unsound mind-are a bit atypical. And so is the chronology; a willingness to expand the boundaries o f legitimate illness so as to include behavior is more typically characteristic o f the nine teenth century. For centuries disease-both specific and generic-has played another role as well. It has helped frame debates about society and social policy; since at least Biblical times the incidence o f disease has served as index and monitory comment on society. Since at least the eigh teenth century, physicians and social commentators have used the difference between " normal" and extraordinary levels of sickness as an implicit indictment o f pathogenic environmental circumstances. Military surgeons worried, for example, about the alarming incidence o f camp and hospital disease; the frequency ot death and disabling sickness in a youthful male population underlined the need for reform in existing camp and barrack arrangements. Medical men in Europe's new industrial cities pointed to the incidence o f fevers and infant deaths among tenement dwellers as evidence o f the need for environ mental reform; the instructive and unquestioned disparity between morbidity and mortality statistics in rural as opposed to urban pop ulations constituted, for example, a compelling case for public health reform (c f., for example , Eyier 1979; Coleman 1982) . A perceived gap between the is and the ought to be has often constituted a powerful rationale for social action.
The rich historical tradition o f social medicine as implicit social criticism was built around the analysis o f disease incidence. Henry Sigerist in the 1930s, for example, like many o f his generation, saw disease incidence as in part a consequence of-and comment oncapitalist social relations; in his younger years, as Elizabeth Fee (1989) emphasizes, Sigerist had tended to view disease as a reflection of culture. What both o f Sigerist's positions had in common was a centuries-old emphasis on the relation between particular incidences o f disease and particular social realities.
But as John Eyier (1989) demonstrates in his discussion of Arthur Newsholme's thought, this style o f social analysis was complex and often self-contradictory. Were individuals responsible for the behavior that placed them at risk-or were they passive victims o f inimical social circumstances? Few physicians could ignore either kind of cau sation-and, in fact, were well aware that both factors could interact, creating " vicious cycles" o f poverty, environmental deprivation, im morality, and ultimate and inevitable disease. In this sense disease became an occasion and agenda for a generation-long debate about the relation among state policy, medical responsibility, and individual culpability. It is a debate that has hardly ceased-as the recent out break o f AIDS has so forcefully emphasized.
AIDS is more than a metaphor for something else-though like plague or cholera it is necessarily that as well. It has reminded us that infectious disease is not simply an occasion for research and clinical investigation or the blaming o f victims, but potentially a matter of life and death. It is a forceful reminder that we have not banished infectious disease-as we have famine-from the developed world.
Earlier generations were hardly in need o f such enlightenment. Ep idemic disease has been omnipresent in human history and thus fun damental in the negotiation o f social values, attitudes, and individual identities. A growing academic concern in recent decades is no more than a respectful obeisance to a fundamental aspect o f perceived social reality in every culture, in every time and every place. Although we have begun to study the history o f disease and have cultivated a growing appreciation o f the potential significance o f such studies, much remains to be done. As the following pages suggest.
the study o f disease constitutes a multidimensional sampling device for the scholar concerned with the relation between social thought and social structure. Although it has been a traditional concern of physicians, antiquarians, and moralists, the study o f disease in modern society is still a comparatively novel one for social scientists. It is more an agenda for future research than a repository of rich scholarly accomplishment. W e need to know more about the individual ex perience o f disease in time and place, the influence o f culture on definitions o f disease and o f disease in the creation o f culture, and the role o f the state in defining and responding to disease. We need to understand the organization o f the medical profession and insti tutional medical care as in part a response to particular patterns of disease incidence. The list could easily be extended, but its implicit burden is clear enough. Disease constirutes a fundamental substantive problem and analytical tool-not only in the history o f medicine, but in the social sciences generally.
